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CORPORATE BUY-SELL AGREEMENTS:
TAX PROBLEMS IN DRAFTING
RICHARD LLOYD STRECKER*
Since the relationship between the owners of a small business is
essentially a dose personal one, even though for legal and tax reasons
the business may be operated in the corporate form, shareholders of
such corporations are typically concerned to maintain ownership
within a congenial group. Much is being written upon this subject at
the present time." The author hopes that lawyers called upon to
draft arrangements designed to "keep a dose corporation dose"2 may
find aid in a paper whose purpose is not to canvass exhaustively the
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. A.B., 1947, LL.B., 195o,
University of Cincinnati; LL.M., 1951, Harvard University. Member of the Ohio
Bar. Valuable research assistance was contributed by Mr. Robert I. Doggett, a
senior at the College of Law, University of Cincinnati.
'Hacker, Corporate Distributions, Liquidations and Related Problems, 3o
Ohio Bar 749 (1955); Hobbet, The New Attack on Stock Redemptions, 35 Taxes
880 (1957); Jones and Gleason, Casale Reversed: Corporate Insurance No Dividend
to Stockholder-an Analysis, 7 J. Taxation 258 (1957); Lawthers, Prunier Reversed:
No Income to Stockholders from Premiums Paid by Corporation, 8 J. Taxation 12
(1958); Lawthers, Prunier Offers No Threat to a Sound Insured Buyout Plan, 7 J-
Taxation 2 (1957); Lawthers, The Fragile Bark of the Small Corporation, 12 J.
Am. Soc'y C.L.U. 4 (1957); Levine, More on Casale: Decision Was Wrong Because
There Was No Severance of Corporate Property, 6 J. Taxation 289 (1957); Mann-
heimer and Friedman, Stock-Retirement Agreements-The Prunier and Sanders
Cases, 35 Taxes 567 (1957); Pavenstedt, The Second Circuit Reaffirms the Efficacy
of Restrictive Stock Agreements to Control Estate Tax Valuation, 51 Mich. L. Rev. i
(1952); Rasman, Stock Redemptions under Section 302 of the 1954 Code, 35 Taxes
355 (1957); Steinberg, Funding Stock-Redemption Agreements with Life Insurance,
35 Taxes 669 (1957); Swados, Death and Nonsense: The Decline and Fall of the
Buy-Sell Agreement, 26 Fordham L. Rev. 189 (1957); Taylor and Maier, Sanders
Case Again Emphasizes Care Needed in Agreements Funded by Insurance, 7 J.
Taxation 68 (1957); Winton and Hoffman, A Case Study of Stock Redemptions
under Sections 302 and 318 of the New Code, io Tax L. Rev. 363 (1955); Young,
Extreme Care Needed Today To Avoid Dividend Treatment of Stock Redemp-
tions, 7 J. Taxation 66 (1957); Note, The Use of Life Insurance to Fund Agree-
ments Providing for Disposition of a Business Interest at Death, 71 Harv. L. Rev.
687 (1958); Note, Casale Reversal Clarifies Relation between Stockholder and
Controlled Corporation, 7 J. Taxation 271 (1957); Note, Pelton Steel: Another Blow
at Planning for Closely Held Corporation, 7 J. Taxation 96 (1957); Note, Could
Casale Have Won If He Had Done It Slightly Differently?, 6 J. Taxation 362 (1957);
Note, Stock Redemptions in Close Corporations: A Plan for Taxation, 67 Yale L.J.
112 (1957).
Many worthwhile comments on this problem are also found in the proceedings
of the various tax institutes. The list above is exhaustive only of comments in
very recent legal periodicals.
'he phrase was suggested by Mr. Paul J. Bickel of the Cleveland Bar. See
note 36 infra.
1958] BUY-SELL TAX PROBLEMS 19
covey of recent cases but rather to guide the draftsman. The author's
pedagogical predilections dispose him to the belief, supported by the
brilliant success of the case and problem method in law school in-
struction, that any complex legal problem is better understood in
reference to concrete facts, if not actual, then hypothetical. Therefore,
our consideration of the problem will begin with a hypothetical case.
I. THE PROBLEM STATED
Dujaggets, Inc., is a corporation engaged in the manufacture and
sale of chromium-plated dujaggets. The business was founded in 1920
by two men who had formerly been engaged in business as partners,
Earl E. Dew and Cliff Jagget. Earl's son, Fogg E. Dew, is a vigorous
and talented young executive in the firm, who is clearly competent to
take over in a top management role. Earl has no other children. Cliff's
only offspring, a daughter Garnet, is married to a successful young
physician, Dr. Medico. Fogg and Garnet each have two small children.
The average net or taxable income of the corporation over the
past ten years has been $ioo,ooo. Before reaching this figure, there was
deducted the amount of $50,000 for salaries to executives: $2o,ooo to
Earl, who is president and general manager, 2o,ooo to Cliff, secretary-
treasurer and production manager, and $ioooo to Fogg, who is not
an officer of the corporation but who does have the responsibility of
sales manager. The board of directors is composed of the following
persons: Earl E. Dew, Mrs. Earl E. Dew, Cliff Jagget, Mrs. Cliff
Jagget, and Attorney I. M. Abel, who is counsel for all the share-
holders individually and for the corporation. It is an amicable group.
Neither of the wives is an officer or employee of the corporation,
although each receives the modest annual fee of $5oo.oc0 for acting as
director. They are faithful in their attendance at meetings.




Fair (same as adjusted
Market Value tax basis)
Cash ........ Sxooooo 1oo,ooo Accounts Payable ............. s 5o,ooo
Marketable
Securities . 400,000 350,000
Accounts
Receivable. 50,000 50,000 Capital Stock, par value
Inventory .... zooooo 75,000 $Soo per share, 5,000 shares... 500,000
Plants and Earned Surplus (assumed to equal
Properties . 400,000 225,000 "earnings and profits') ...... 250,000
$1,050,000 $80o,ooo $8oo,ooo
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Thus, the net book value of the corporation is $75o,ooo and the
book value of each share is $15o. The present net asset value of the
corporation, based on fair market value of its assets is $i,ooo,ooo, each
share representing $2ood of net asset value.
The shares of stock of Dujaggets, Inc., are owned by the following
persons in the amount set opposite each name:
Percentage
No. of Shares Ownership
Earl E. D ew .................................................................. 1,500o 30
M rs. Earl E. D ew .......................................................... 500 10
Fogg E. D ew .................................................................. 500 10
C liff Jagget .................................................................... 1,500 30
M rs. Cliff Jagget ............................................................ 5oo 1
Garnet Jagget M edico .................................................. 500 10
5,000 100
Both Mrs. Dew and Mrs. Jagget received their shares as gifts from
their husbands more than ten years ago. Fogg E. Dew and Garnet
Jagget Medico received their shares as gifts from their fathers also more
than ten years ago. Since the original cost of each of the shares was
$1oo, paid by Earl and Cliff at the time the corporation was formed in
192o, and since all other shareholders received their stock by inter
vivos gift, the tax basis of the shares in the hands of each of the share-
holders is $ioo. At the present time, neither the articles of incorpora-
tion, the by-laws, nor any contract or agreement places restrictions
upon the disposition which a shareholder of Dujaggets, Inc., may
make of his stock, either during life or on the occasion of his death.
II. WHY HAVE A BuY-SELL?
Earl E. Dew, Cliff Jagget and Fogg E. Dew have been thinking
a good deal about what will happen to the business when the found-
ers die, or when the shares of any other shareholder, through death
or otherwise, pass into the hands of persons outside the present har-
monious group. Discussing this problem with other businessmen, their
life insurance salesman, the trust officer at the local bank, and their
accountant, they have concluded that it would be highly desirable
to enter into some kind of "buy-sell agreement" whereby this prob-
lem would be solved. They have in mind that, in addition to the
primary goal of maintaining ownership within a congenial group, such
an arrangement might accomplish certain other important objectives:
(i) the eventual transfer of control of the corporation from the found-
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ers to young Fogg E. Dew, without whose continuing efforts the com-
pany's future appears bleak; (2) the provision of liquid funds to the
estate of any shareholder for the payment of estate taxes; (3) the fixing
of an upper limit upon the estate tax valuation of the shares, thus, at
least, precluding expensive controversy and litigation and possibly
avoiding disastrous overvaluation; (4) the minimizing of the separation
of ownership from management by preventing the introduction of ad-
ditional inactive shareholders against the will of the surviving active
shareholders. 3
III. WHO SHOULD Buy?
The fundamental question that must be answered before beginning
the drafting of a buy-sell arrangement is: Who will buy the shares? In
the event that a shareholder wishes to sell during life, or in case of a
shareholder's death, should the remaining shareholders purchase the
shares of the departing shareholder, or should his shares be purchased
by the corporation? Perhaps the more common practice, and what is
usually referred to as a "buy-sell agreement" in the narrow sense, is an
arrangement whereby the surviving shareholders purchase. It is some-
times overlooked, however, that from the viewpoint of the ultimate
percentage ownership and control of the corporation, either method
accomplishes precisely the same result.4 For example, on the occasion
of Earl E. Dew's death, the surviving shareholders, as a group, will
own ioo per cent of the stock of the corporation whether Dew's shares
are purchased by the corporation or purchased proportionately by each
of the surviving shareholders. Of course, the percentage ownership
and the voting power of each surviving shareholder will increase to
exactly the same figure whether each buys a proportionately larger
number of shares, or the total number of outstanding shares is reduced,
increasing the proportionate interest. The present system of corporate
income taxation, involving as it does what is frequently referred to
as the double taxation of corporate business earnings, provides a
powerful argument in favor of selecting the redemption route. Business
income earned by a corporation is, to the extent paid out to sharehold-
ers in dividends, subject first to the corporate tax at a maximum rate of
52 per cent, and the remainder is subjected to a further tax as the indi-
WMannheimer and Friedman, Stock Retirement Agreements, 28 Taxes 423, 425
(1956), citing White, Business Insurance, 4o6. See also 67 Yale L. J. 112, 119 (1957).
'From the viewpoint of the size and financial situation of the corporation after
a shareholder has retired from the scene, the two methods differ drastically in re-
sult. This is discussed infra under the heading "Income Tax Consequences to Re-
maining Shareholder,"
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vidual income of the shareholder, at a maximum rate of 91 percent.
"Double taxation" and high surtax rates combine to make it extremely
difficult, if not impossible, for men of a moderately high income level,
most of which is derived from a corporate business, to accumulate the
amount of liquid funds which would be required to purchase a large
block of stock from the estate of a deceased fellow shareholder. Double
taxation of corporate business earnings is ameliorated to a limited ex-
tent by the accumulation of earnings until sale of shares converts the
accumulation into capital gain 5 or, indeed, until death, when the
stepped-up basis6 in effect forgives the shareholder tax on the accu-
mulation. However, the usefulness of these is sharply limited by the
existence of the "accumulated earnings tax."7 Of course, the use of
certain methods, such as the payment of salaries to active shareholders8
and interest on debt securities issued to shareholders,9 give limited
relief from the corporate tax. To the extent these methods are suc-
cessfully employed, the earnings are, because of the corporate deduction
for these items, subjected only to a single shareholder tax. Unfortu-
nately for Attorney Abel's clients, the doctrines concerning "reasonable
compensation,"' 0 "hybrid securities,"" and "thin incorporation"'
2
permit only limited escape. Thus, to a considerable extent in most
companies, the business earnings are subjected to both corporate
and individual taxation. To the extent that funds for redemption
can be accumulated at the cost of only the corporate tax, it is finan-
cially much more feasible to have the corporation redeem shares than
to have the remaining shareholders purchase them.
5Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 1201-02. Hereafter, references to the Code vill be
made simply by section number.
OSection 1014 provides that the basis of property includible in the gross estate
of a decedent shall, in the hands of the estate, legatee, or heir, be fair market value




"°See, for example, Lucas v. Ox Fibre Brush Co., 281 U.S. 115 (1930); Long
Island Drug Co. v. Comm'r, x1t F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1940); Wright-Bernet, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 172 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1949).
uJohn Kelley Co. v. Comm'r, 326 U.s. 521 (1946); Kraft Foods Co. v. Comm'r, 232
F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1956); Wetterau Grocer Co., Inc. v. Comm'r, 179 F. 2d 158 (8th
Cir. 1950).
'-Gooding Amusement Co., Inc. v. Comm'r, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 1031 (1957); Ruspyn Corp., 18 T.C. 769 (1952); Swoby Corp., 9
T.C. 887 (1947). See Bittker, Thin Capitalization: Some Current Questions, 34 Taxes
830 (1956); Note, Gooding Test "What Was Stockholder Debtor's Intent?" Is Unfair,
7 J. Taxation 70 (1957). For an excellent early article see Schlesinger, "Thin"
Incorporations, Income Tax Advantage and Pitfalls, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 50 (1947).
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A. Income Tax Consequences to Remaining Shareholder.
If Earl E. Dew and Cliff Jagget, the founders of our corporation,
had retained all the shares originally owned by them, they each would
own 5o per cent of the stock of Dujaggets, Inc. If, at the death or
withdrawal of Earl E. Dew, the corporation redeems all the shares
formerly owned by him, it is apparent that the proportional interest of
Cliff Jagget would increase from 5o to ioo per cent. To accomplish this
redemption, using the figures of our hypothetical case, assume that the
corporation makes a distribution to the estate of Earl E. Dew consist-
ing of money and property in the total amount of $5oo,ooo. This would
represent the net asset value of the shares. Could it be that the surviving
shareholder, Cliff Jagget, has realized dividend income in the amount
of the $5oo,ooo distribution, since this corporate expenditure bene-
fited him, a shareholder, by doubling his proportionate interest in the
corporation? Several early cases held he did not.13 However, where
the surviving shareholder was legally obligated to purchase the shares
of the deceased or retiring shareholder, the corporate expenditure
resulting in the discharge of the survivor's legal obligation has been
held to be taxable income to him.14 Two recent decisions of the Tax
Court, both of which are now on appeal, have reached the result that
the surviving shareholder whose proportionate interest is increased
does realize dividend income to the extent of the amount distributed
to the deceased or retiring shareholder.15 These cases reached this
result without regard to whether the surviving shareholder was legally
'"Ray Edenfield, 19 T.C. 13 (1952); Fred Fischer, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 520,
P-H 1947 T.C. Mem. Dec. par. 47,131 (1947). Though the issue was not raised,
Jackson Howell, 26 T.C. 846 (1956), reached the same result on its facts. On
principle, though the facts are somewhat different, Tucker v. Comm'r, 226 F.2d
177 (8th Cir. 1955), is in accord with Edenfield and Fischer.
"'Wall v. United States, 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947). But see Fred Fischer, note 13
supra, in which the remaining shareholder was legally obligated either to buy or to
find another buyer for the retiring shareholder's stock. Redemption to eliminate a
cantankerous minority shareholder was upheld as serving a valid corporate busi-
ness purpose.
rLouis H. Zipp, 28 T.C. 314 (1957). An appeal taken on August 21, 1957 by the
remaining shareholders, Monroe Zipp and Bernard Zipp, to the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit is pending. The Commissioner has acquiesced in the con-
clusion that the departing shareholder, Louis H. Zipp, received capital gain on
the occasion of the redemption of his shares. 1957 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 45, at 7. Pre-
sumably, the protective appeal taken by the Government to the Fifth Circuit in the
case of the departing shareholder will not be prosecuted. The other case is Joseph
R. Holsey, 28 T.C. 962 (1957), appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit filed by taxpayer on December 13, 1957.
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obligated to purchase the shares redeemed by the corporation, and in
at least one of them, it was dear that he was not.' 6
In the hypothetical case posed immediately above, while it is clear
that the proportionate interest of the surviving shareholder, Cliff
Jagget, increases from 50 to ioo per cent, is it true that Cliff actually is
benefited? These Tax Court decisions appear to have overlooked the
fact that while Cliff's percentage has doubled, the total net asset value
of the corporation has at the same time been cut in half. Whereas the
net asset value had formerly been $i,doo,ooo of which 50 per cent or
$Soo,ooo was owned by Cliff, the net asset value of the corporation
after the redemption is only $5oo,ooo of which loci per cent is owned
by Cliff.
Carrying this analysis one step further, suppose that a "buy-sell
agreement" between Earl E. Dew and Cliff Jagget had required the
corporation to redeem the shares of the first to die at a price of $300
per share, or a total of $750,000 for one-half of the shares. Had such an
agreement been carried out, the Tax Court would presumably have
held that Cliff had $75d,ooo of dividend income.17 And yet, it would be
more accurate to say that Cliff had suffered a loss of $250,000 in the
value of his shares'1
8
16Holsey, supra note 15. While the Zipp case is not based upon the theory that
the corporation discharged a legal obligation of the surviving shareholder to buy,
the facts strongly suggest that such an obligation was created by the negotiations
prior to redemption. The court stresses that, "In effect, they [the surviving share-
holders] caused Paramount's [the corporation's] cash to be distributed for their
benefit, i.e., to purchase all of Louis' [the departing shareholder's] stock."
'"Under § 316, a shareholder can be held to have dividend income only to the
extent that the corporation has either current or accumulated "earnings and
profits." A distribution, not in exchange for stock, in excess of the "earnings and
profits" is treated as a tax-free return of capital up to the amount of the basis of the
shares. § 3oi(c)(z). Once basis has been entirely recovered, any excess is treated as
capital gain. § 3o1(c)(3). See Comm'r v. Hirshon Trust, 213 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 861, 862 (1954); Comm'r v. Timken, 141 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1944).
As to distributions made after June 22, 1954, see U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.316-1(a)(2) and
(3) (1954)-
"Earnings and profits" is a phrase of art in the tax law. It is not identical with
taxable income or with earned surplus. E.g., tax-exempt municipal bond interest
is included in "earnings and profits." U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.115(a)-2. A stock
dividend, while reducing earned surplus, does not reduce earnings and profits.
§ 312(d)(1)(B). However, in most cases, earned surplus will be the same as accu-
mulated earnings and profits.
nWhereas the net asset value of Cliff's shares was formerly $5oo,ooo it is now
reduced to only $250,000. For all that appears in the lengthy but incomplete state-
ment of facts in Zipp, supra note 15, the survivors may actually have suffered a
decline in the net asset value of their shares. The serious weakness in both Zipp
and Holsey, supra note 15, lies in the failure to state, let alone discuss, the facts
regarding value of the survivor's stock interest before and after the redemption. See
note 19 infra.
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Suppose, on the other hand, that a "buy-sell agreement" between
Earl E. Dew and Cliff Jagget had required the corporation to re-
deem the shares of the first to die at a price of $15o per share (book
value) or a total of $375,ooo. In this situation, it is at least arguable
that Cliff Jagget, the surviving shareholder, has benefited by the re-
demption. The net asset value represented by his shares has increased
from 5oo,ooo to 56.25,ooo, a difference of $125,000.19 Yet even here,
it is clearly wrong to suggest that his benefit and tax liability is
measured by the amount distributed in redemption of the decedent's
shares. Such an approach would result in attributing $375,000 income
to a transaction which at the most benefited the survivor by $125,000.
Thus it appears that whether a surviving shareholder actually bene-
fits from the redemption of the shares of others will depend altogether
on the redemption price and its relation to actual value. If redemption
is made at a price equal to the fair market value of the shares, 20 it is
hard to see how any measurable benefit has been conferred upon the
surviving shareholder. If the redemption price is more than actual val-
ue, the curious result is that the survivor suffers an economic loss,
though probably not sufficiently realized to permit its deduction for
tax purposes.
Finally, if the redemption price is lower than actual value, it may be
that the shareholder is benefited, although the amount of his benefit
bears no necessary relationship to the actual amount distributed in
redemption of the retiring shareholder's stock. Indeed, the extent
"This appears to have been the case in Joseph R. Holsey, supra note 15. While
the court does not discuss the fair market value of the shares, or even their net
asset value, the corporation had an earned surplus of approximately S3ooooo on
the date of the redemption, and the redemption price of a 5o per cent stock interest
was only $So,ooo. If the value of the corporate assets was not substantially short
of their net book value, then the earned surplus, plus a small $iooo capital
stock account, represented the minimum net asset value of the company. Thus,
the surviving shareholder may have acquired an additional interest worth ap-
proximately 915o,ooo. The cash outlay of the corporation, $8oooo, was the amount
attempted to be taxed. In this case, the option price was higher than value
at the time it was originally granted in 1946. The increase in value taking place
after the grant of the option led to the result that the option price five years later
was actually a bargain. This possibility exists in any case where a buy-sell agree-
ment involves a fixed price.
OlThe foregoing discussion was based upon net asset value rather than fair
market value. The author realizes that net asset value does not necessarily cor-
respond to fair market value. History and prospects with regard to earnings, whether
favorable or unfavorable, will also influence value. In the case of most small closely
held corporations, net asset value would closely approximate fair market value.
It should be recognized, however, that a controlling interest may be worth more
than the net asset value of that number of shares, and that a minority interest
may be worth less than the net asset value of the shares. See note 21 infra.
19581
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of his benefit is so difficult to ascertain that it probably should not
be regarded as realized for tax purposes, any more than would be a
corresponding loss.
21
The important drafting consideration suggested by these cases is
this: To the extent that redemption at a price below actual value
might result in realized income to the survivor, this threat can be
minimized by a proper provision regarding the redemption price,
which is probably dictated by fairness anyway. If the redemption
price is set at fair market value of the shares, the attribution of in-
come to the survivor is rendered extremely unlikely.
Another powerful argument against the attribution of income
to the survivor, whatever the redemption price, has been stated by
Professor Surrey and Dean Warren:
"Is the result of a dividend [to the surviving shareholder]
intended by a Congress which went to extreme pains in section
3o2(b)( 3) to make sure that the redemption would not fail of ac-
complishment because of the fear of a dividend [to the deceased
or retiring shareholder]. But a dividend result for [the surviving
shareholder] would equally block the redemption."
22
B. Income Tax Consequences to Departing Shareholder.
The income tax consequences to the retiring shareholder or to the
estate of a deceased shareholder involve important problems. The
biggest difficulty presented is to make sure that when the stock is re-
deemed or purchased by the corporation the transaction will not be
treated as essentially equivalent to the distribution of a dividend to
the departing shareholder or his personal representative. 23 Dividend
2nThe discrepancy between net asset value and fair market value of shares,
discussed in note 2o, is one of the reasons why it may be impracticable to consider
income as arising from the mere unascertainable increase in value of the survi-
vor's shares. Cf. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (192o), holding that a share-
holder does not realize income, within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment,
from the distribution of an ordinary stock dividend, since in essence such distribu-
tion represents a mere increase in value of the underlying shares. While Koshland
v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (936) found realized income where the stock dividend
increased the recipient's proportional interest, there the taxpayer actually received
property whose value was ascertainable. Even so, § 305 has abandoned the impo-
sition of tax largely because of difficulties similar to those encountered in the
Zipp-Holsey situation. See also Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931) and J. Darsie
Lloyd, 33 B.T.A. 9o3 (1936), Acq. (and Nonacq. withdrawn) 1950-2 Cum. Bull.
3, holding that income is not realized even upon a sale where the value of the
consideration received has no ascertainable fair market value.
-CCH, Surrey & Warren, Federal Taxation-Current Law and Practice, par.
1214, p. 371 (Dec. 1957).
"§§ 3o2(d), go3(c).
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treatment has two drawbacks: (i) the entire amount received, without
any offset for cost-basis of the shares, is taxed;24 and (2) this amount is
treated as ordinary income. The desired consequence would be to
obtain capital gain treatment. In the case of the share purchase, this
would mean: (i) the cost-basis of the shares is offset against the amount
received before any gain is computed; 25 and (2) the resulting gain is
taxed at a maximum rate of 25 per cent.2 6 Where shares are redeemed
from an estate, a capital gain redemption will frequently not result in
any tax. This is because the cost-basis of the shares in the hands of the
estate is equal to fair market value at the time of death.2 7 Thus, the
proceeds of a redemption occurring shortly after death will frequently
equal the tax cost-basis, with the result that the gain is zero.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 usually treats stock re-
demptions as dividends to the extent that the corporation has either
current or accumulated "earnings or profits." 28 However, several clear
exceptions are made which can, after proper analysis, form the basis
for a favorable advance opinion to the effect that a given stock re-
demption will result in capital gain treatment. Three of these excep-
tions are of interest to us in the planning stage.
First, a distribution in redemption of all the shares, preferred and
common, owned by a particular shareholder will be treated as a capital
gain transaction. This is called "termination of interest." 29 Also, if
such a large number of shares is redeemed that the percentage of vot-
ing power and ownership of the particular shareholder is sharply re-
duced (to less than 8o per cent of what it was prior to the redemp-
tion), again capital gain treatment will be given. This is referred to
as a "disproportionate redemption." 30 One or the other of these rules
will frequently suffice to assure that a stock redemption during life
will qualify. It is to be noted, however, that in both cases, the "family
ownership rules" of section 38 apply.3 ' The effect of that section is
to attribute to a shareholder whose shares are being redeemed the
ownership of shares nominally and actually owned by other persons,
if those persons bear certain designated relationships to the departing
-'See Katcher, The Case of the Forgotten Basis, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 465 (1950);
U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(c) (1955).
2§§ 302(a), iooi(a).
5See note 5 supra.
"'See note 6 supra.
§§ 302(d), 3o(c), and 316(a). See note 17 supra.
§ 302(b)(3).
m§ 3o(b)(2). In any event, the shareholder must hold less than 5o per cent of
the voting stock after the redemption. § 3o2(b)(2)(B).
"'§ 302(C)(1).
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shareholder. For the purpose of the "termination of interest" rule,
though not for purposes of the "disproportionate redemption" rule,
some relief from these family ownership rules is available if the de-
parting shareholder undertakes not to reacquire an interest in the
corporation, other than as a creditor, for ten years following the
redemption.
32
Careful analysis of the particular factual situation is necessary,
with special attention being given to the effect of the ownership at-
tribution rules upon any contemplated redemption. Such an exami-
nation will frequently lead to the conclusion that a contemplated re-
demption will come within the rule regarding termination of inter-
est. This provision, sometimes aided by the disproportionate redemp-
tion rule, will frequently assure capital gain treatment for redemp-
tions of stock that take place while the shareholder is still living.
Where the shares are redeemed at death, the effect is a purchase
from the estate of the deceased shareholder rather than from the de-
ceased shareholder himself. In such a case, the estate attribution rules
set out in section 318 treat an estate as owning the shares owned
by its beneficiaries. In this circumstance, an entirely independent
analysis is necessary, applying different principles based upon the last
will and testament of the shareholder whose stock is being redeemed.
Numerous problems arise, a thorough discussion of which is found
elsewhere.
33
In cases where shares of stock owned by an estate are redeemed,
an additional exception from dividend treatment is provided to
the extent that such a redemption is made for the purpose of rais-
ing funds to pay estate and inheritance taxes and the cost of ad-
ministration of the decedent's estate.34 This provision may have
the advantage of applying to a situation in which only preferred or
non-voting stock is redeemed, and in general is useful where only a
part of the shares are sought to be redeemed. On the other hand, the
provision is limited to cases in which the shares of the corporation
whose stock is being redeemed form a large portion of the decedent's
estate.3 5 This section certainly does not replace the others referred to
2§ 302(c)(2).
mSee especially the articles by Hacker and by Winton and Hoffman, cited in
note i supra.
N§ 303.
nThe stock of the corporation (whose shares are being redeemed) must com-
prise more than 35 per cent of the gross estate or more than 5o per cent of the tax-
able estate of the deceased. Where a decedent owned more than 75 per cent of the
total stock of two or more corporations, these holdings may be added together for
the purpose of the 85 per cent or 5o per cent rule.
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above, which in some cases, particularly where a large redemption is
contemplated, may be far more useful.
C. Conclusion: Who Should Buy?
Because of the double tax on corporate earnings, it is extremely
difficult for a surviving shareholder to accumulate enough funds to
enable him to purchase the shares of a retiring shareholder. Therefore,
it is financially more feasible for a corporation to redeem the shares
of a departing shareholder. If the redemption price is set at fair market
value, no income should result to the surviving shareholder by reason
of the redemption of the shares of the retiring or deceased shareholder.
W~ith a careful eye to the attribution of ownership rules set out in sec-
tion 318, most stock redemptions in connection with buy-sell arrange-
ments can be made to qualify for capital gain treatment to the depart-
ing shareholder or his estate.
IV. WHO SHOULD BE BOUND?
There are numerous types of stock restrictions that have been em-
ployed for various purposes. Absolute restrictions on transfer are
invalid as restraints on alienation, while many reasonable contrac-
tual restrictions are upheld.3 6 The types of provisions in most common
use today include the following:
I. Where the corporation is to buy shares
A. During the shareholder's life:
i. First offer-If a shareholder wishes to sell, he must first
offer (at a price fixed in the contract) to the corporation
which has an option to buy.
2. First refusal-similar to "first offer," except that in "first
offer" the price is fixed by contract, whereas in "first re-
fusal" the price is fixed by the shareholder when he de-
sires to sell. This is a much less stringent restriction.
B. At the shareholder's death:
i. First offer.
2. First refusal.
3. Option-Corporation has option to buy at fixed price,
whether or not the estate wishes to sell.
4. Binding bilateral contract.
3 This paper makes no pretense of completeness on the corporate law aspects
of this problem. For two excellent discussions see O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer
of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Planning and Drafting, 64 Harv. L. Rev.
773 (1952); and Bickel, Keeping a Close Corporation Close, 23 Ohio Bar 537 (1950).
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II. Where the remaining shareholder is to buy shares
A. During the shareholder's life:
i. First offer.
2. First refusal.




4. Binding bilateral contract.
The selection among these twelve possibilities will, of course, be
governed largely by the practical goals sought to be achieved. It was
recommended above that purchase by the corporation is generally
advantageous; however, one may wish to protect against a failure of
this plan (due to corporation law, dissenting shareholders, or prac-
tical financial obstacles) by providing for alternative purchase by the
remaining shareholders.
Redemption will present problems under the corporation law of
many states. Sometimes these problems can be handled by appropriate
provisions in the articles of incorporation; 37 research may be necessary
to ascertain the law on this point with respect to any particular state.
It will be recalled that where the surviving shareholder is legally
obligated to purchase the shares of the departing shareholder, and
where the shares of the departing shareholder are redeemed by the
corporation, it has been held that the survivor realizes dividend in-
come by the disbursement of corporate funds in discharge of his legal
obligation.38 This consideration renders inadvisable any provision
binding the survivor to purchase the shares of the departing person.
A. Pegging Estate Tax Valuation.
One of the goals frequently sought to be achieved through the
use of a buy-sell arrangement is to fix an upper limit on the value
which may be attributed to the shares for estate tax purposes. To the
extent that this can be done, controversy with Internal Revenue
Service authorities, litigation, and, most important, costly over-
valuation may be avoided. Numerous cases have given conclusive ef-
"Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 17o. 3 5 (A) (Baldwin Supp. 1957) authorizes a corpo-
ration to purchase its own shares, "(7) When the articles in substance provide that
the corporation shall have a right to repurchase if and when any shareholder de-
sires to, or on the happening of any event is required to sell such shares.
SSSee note 14 supra.
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fect to contractual provisions which bound the deceased shareholder's
executor or administrator to sell at a fixed price.3 9 Proposed treasury
regulations recognize that, at least where the agreement is entered
into at arm's length, it will fix an upper limit on estate tax valuation.
4 0
However, these regulations deny effect to a mere "first refusal." That
is, the option price must be fixed in the contract and not fixed by the
selling shareholder when he decides to sell. Most important, the regu-
lations provide that, "Ordinarily, no effect will be given to an option
or contract under which the decedent is free to dispose of the under-
lying securities at any price he chooses during his life." This view,
the soundness of which may be questioned, has some support in
the decisions.41 While it may be argued that if the personal represen-
tative is absolutely bound to sell at the fixed price, and that the
absence of restrictions during the deceased shareholder's life is ir-
relevant, prudence dictates that agreements be drafted to conform
to the regulations. Only in this way can the agreement attain its goal
of simplifying estate tax valuation. Therefore, it is recommended that
all shareholders should be subject to at least "first offer" restrictions
at a fixed price 42 during life, and that their executor or administra-
tor should be similarly obligated.
B. All or Nothing at All.
Some estates have been embarrassed by a buy-sell agreement that
confers upon the corporation or the surviving shareholders an option
to purchase at a favorable price, but which apparently permits them
to exercise that option as to all or any part of the shares held by the de-
cedent. The importance of control in a closely held corporation is so
paramount in ascertaining value that frequently the estate is threat-
ened with a partial exercise of the option leaving the estate holding
an unmarketable minority interest whose value is uncertain. In
order to guard against this situation, it seems advisable to require
'Afay v. McGowan, 194 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1951); Lomb v. Sugden, 82 F.2d 166
(2d Cir. 1936); Wilson v. Bowers, 57 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1932); Commn'r v. Bensel, 1oo
F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1938); Brodrick v. Gore, 224 F.2d 896 (loth Cir. 1955); Estate of
Lionel Weil, 22 T.C. 1276 (954).
"Proposed Estate Tax Reg. § 20.20 3 1-2(h) (1956).
"tRobert R. Gannon, 21 T.C. 1073 (1954); Estate of George M. Trammell, iS
T.C. 662 (1952); Estate of James H. Matthews, 3 T.C. 525 (1944); Clare G. Hoff-
man, 2 T.C. 116o (1943), aff'd on other issues, 148 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 730 (1945); Estate of Edward R. Armstrong, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
77 (1944), aft'd, 146 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1945).
'=The difficult problem of what to use for the option or contract price is dis-
cussed infra under the heading "Price."
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the corporation or the surviving shareholders, as the case may be, to
exercise their option as a whole or not at all. Of course, a binding
contract obligating the corporation to buy all shares, or all shares
offered by the estate, would protect against this hazard.43 As mentioned
above, a contract binding the surviving shareholders to buy is in-
advisable since it may cause any redemption to give rise to dividend
income to the surviving shareholders.
C. The Option Rule.
In determining whether a particular departing shareholder real-
izes ordinary dividend income or captial gain from the amounts paid
in redemption of his shares, it will be recalled that the shares of stock
owned by certain close relatives are treated as owned by the shareholder
whose shares are redeemed. In addition, section 318 provides that any
shareholder whose shares are redeemed shall be treated as owning
any shares which he "has an option to acquire...." Buy-sell agree-
ments frequently take the form of giving "options" or "rights to
purchase" to surviving shareholders in the event that another share-
holder either desires to sell during life or dies owning shares. The
thought occurs: could these "options" given to surviving shareholders
cause the holders to be treated as the owners of the shares subject to
the option for the purpose of determining whether any redemption
is to be treated as a dividend to the departing shareholder?
44
This problem can be illustrated by the following example based
upon our hypothetical facts. Suppose that all the shareholders of
Dujaggets, Inc., had entered into an agreement whereby each was
given a right to a first offer to buy his proportionate part of the shares
of any shareholder who might desire to sell. Suppose that Earl E. Dew
desires to have some or all of his shares redeemed by Dujaggets, Inc.
The family ownership rules of section 318 will attribute to Earl the
ownership of the following shares: 1,5oo shares owned by Earl E.
Dew, 500d shares owned by his wife, and 500 shares owned by his son,
or a total of 2,500 shares. If the buy-sell agreement is treated as con-
ferring upon Earl an option to acquire his proportionate part (30
per cent) of the shares owned by the other shareholders, the result
would be to attribute to Earl the ownership of the following addi-
43A contract binding the corporation to redeem raises difficult corporate law
problems. See note 37 supra. It may be wise to provide that, in any event, a share-
holder shall not be bound to accept redemption of a smaller number of shares
than would qualify for assured capital gain treatment under § 3o2.
"Mr. Donald C. Alexander of the Cincinnati Bar called the problem to the
writer's attention.
BUY-SELL TAX PROBLEMS
tional shares:45 450 shares, which is 80 per cent of the 1,5oo shares
owned by Cliff Jagget; 150 shares. which is 3o per cent of the 5oo
shares owned by Jagget's wife; and 15o shares, which is 3o per cent
of the shares owned by Jagget's daughter, or a total of 750 additional
shares. The total number of shares so attributed to Earl would be 3,250.
If this threat is real, the situation is even worse than would appear
at first glance. This is because there is some relief from the family
ownership rules if a shareholder completely and permanently termi-
nates his own actual interest in the corporation.46 Thus, were it not
for the option rule, a redemption of all 1,5oo of the shares owned by
Earl in his own name would qualify for capital gain treatment.
However, section 802(c) provides for relief from only the family owner-
ship rules of section 88; the rules of constructive ownership based
upon other factors, including holding an option, apply without ex-
ception. The Internal Revenue Service has not taken an official posi-
tion on this question.
However, to regard the holder of a right to a "first offer" as the
holder of an "option to acquire" within the meaning of the constructive
ownership rules of section 818 seems unreasonable. The surviving
shareholder really has no option at all until and unless another share-
holder decides to sell his shares. It seems highly improbable that sec-
tion 818 would apply to a right which is subject to an unpredictable
condition precedent.
Suppose that in the event of the death of one of the other share-
holders, Earl E. Dew would have an absolute "option to acquire"
the shares from the estate of the deceased shareholder. As in the case
of the first offer during life, the "option" ripens only upon a condi-
tion; here the death of one of the shareholders. While this con-
dition is certain to occur at some time, it is not certain to occur dur-
ing the life of any particular "surviving" shareholder. That is, while
each of the other shareholders will certainly die at some time, there is
no certainty that Earl will survive any one of them. The likelihood of
his surviving all is probably very small. Therefore, it seems incorrect
to regard Earl as the holder of an "option to acquire" within the
meaning of section 3 18, at least while all other shareholders are living.
Nevertheless the possibility exists that the option rule applies to
"first offers" and options (effective at death) conferred upon "surviv-
'5The exact percentage which any surviving shareholder is entitled to pur-
chase can be ascertained only when it is known which other shareholder is depart-
ing. Absent such information, the 3o per cent figure is certainly not too high. The
actual figure may be higher.
"See note 32 supra.
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ing" shareholders by possible future "departing" shareholders. The
draftsman may regard this possibility as serious enough to justify
efforts to preclude the untoward results which can be conjured up.
The drafting problem is twofold: (i) to safeguard a redemption
during a particular shareholder's life, and (2) to protect a redemption
of a deceased shareholder's stock.
In the case of a redemption of shares during the particular share-
holder's life, it has been suggested 47 that if the "first offer" is drafted
in such a manner that it will "run with the shares," the option rule
will not seriously threaten the redemption. That is to say, if the first
offer ceases to be available to a shareholder instantaneously upon his
ceasing to be a shareholder, at least a complete termination of interest
ought to be accomplished without difficulty. It is true that in the split
second before the entire holding of shares would be redeemed, the
departing shareholder might have held an "option" and hence owned
some shares not redeemed. However, this seems insignificant in view of
the fact that immediately after the redemption, the departing share-
holder would hold no shares either outright or by virtue of the ex-
pired "option." Although this solution will suffice only in the case
of a complete termination of interest, it seems to the writer to be rea-
sonably satisfactory in this most common situation. Following is a
clause which might be inserted in first offer arrangements dealing
with restrictions on inter vivos transfer. The purpose is to make clear
that the option runs with the shares.
The right to purchase conferred upon the remaining share-
holders by this agreement is intended to run with the shares;
a remaining shareholder's right to purchase shall cease instanta-
neously when he ceases to be a shareholder, whether by transfer
to a third person (who shall then have the rights) or to the cor-
poration.
The other drafting problem raised by the option rule is protecting
the estate of a deceased shareholder from dividend treatment when the
deceased's shares are redeemed. Buy-sell agreements frequently pro-
vide that their provisions will apply and inure to the benefit of the
personal representative of any deceased shareholder. The problems
raised by the option rule may call for a revision of this clause. While
it is frequently desirable to have the estate of the deceased shareholder
bound by first offer, option, or bilateral contract, practical necessity
4 7The suggestion was made by Mr. Donald G. Rowlings of the Cincinnati Bar.
It may well be that the operation of law would bring the same result as the draft
proposed below.
BUY-SELL TAX PROBLEMS
would rarely require that the estate succeed to the "first offer" restric-
tions or to the option to buy in the event of the death of another
shareholder. If the personal representative of the deceased shareholder
is entitled to such rights, the option rule of section 318 may make him
a constructive owner of a proportionate part of all stock owned by the
surviving shareholders. Such a result might be catastrophic. A re-
demption of the estate's shares could never qualify as a complete
termination of interest, and accomplishing a disproportionate redemp-
tion might be rendered exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.
The author offers a suggested solution to this problem, embodied
in the following clause to be inserted in buy-sell agreements. Its purpose,
obviously, is to prevent the estate of a deceased shareholder from suc-
ceeding to the first offer or option rights possessed by the deceased
shareholder himself.
The executor or administrator, heirs, next of kin, devisees,
legatees, or any other assignee or transferee of a shareholder
shall be subject to all restrictions and duties herein provided.
However, in the event of death of a shareholder, any right to
purchase from other shareholders conferred by this agreement
shall terminate instantaneously and the shareholder's personal
representative shall have no right to purchase the shares of any
other shareholder who may die or may wish to sell.
D. Conclusion: Who should be bound?
Many considerations, some of which have not been mentioned here,
may enter into this decision. Speaking generally, the following con-
clusions seem advisable to the writer. Most objectives will be ac-
complished by first offer restrictions, at a fixed price, during life,
coupled with a binding contract or option at death. Any option at
death should be exercisable only as a whole, and not in part. Agree-
ments binding the surviving shareholders to purchase should be
avoided. Agreements binding the corporation to purchase may be
desirable if corporate law and practical financial obstacles can be
overcome. In drafting first offer and option restrictions, it may be
advisable to attempt to avoid the problems posed by the option rule
of section V18. This can be accomplished by making the option "run
with the shares," and not permitting the personal representative of
a shareholder to succeed to the decedent's rights to purchase.
V. PIUCE
Perhaps the most frequently used method of, setting the price is to
refer to book value of the shares as shown by a financial statement
prepared reasonably near the date of sale under the contract. The
1958]
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advantages of book value are principally two: (a) it is ascertainable
with reasonable accuracy and ease, and (b) its use in times of in-
flation, when actual value frequently exceeds book (based on historic
cost), can sometimes result in substantial estate tax savings. Two notes
of warning must be sounded. If the buyer under a favorable book value
contract is the natural object of the seller's bounty, as in the case
of a father-son sale, the Internal Revenue Service holds that the re-
strictions are not conclusive in establishing estate tax value.48 While
some cases reach different results, 49 the persuasive force of the Treas-
ury's position casts considerable doubt on the effectiveness of any
scheme to mask a legacy with a buy-sell arrangement. If the buyer
is not the natural object of the seller's bounty, a sale at book value
when such value is far short of actual value has the effect of divert-
ing a substantial amount of the seller's property and estate into the
hands of persons not dependent on him and away from his own fami-
ly.
In times of inflation, and in times of depression as well, the only
fair price is fair market value at the time of sale. Furthermore, as seen
above, such a price will minimize the risk of the realization of income
by the surviving shareholders from the distribution of corporate
funds in redemption of the retiring shareholder's stock.
If fair market value is not immediately ascertainable from any
convenient source, probably the most satisfactory way of determining
the value is through the use of arbitration. The typical tripartite
arbitration body can be established, one member to be appointed by
the selling shareholder, one member to be appointed by the corpora-
tion or the purchasing shareholder, as the case may be, and these
two to appoint a third. One important caveat: courts sometimes
regard contractual provisions for the ascertainment of value of proper-
ty as intending something less binding than arbitration.50 It is there-
fore a wise precaution to state expressly that:
The arbitrators' determination of fair market value shall
be absolutely binding and conclusive on all parties and their
successors in interest and may not be questioned in any subse-
quent proceedings.
"See note 40 supra.
'For example, Brodrick v. Gore, note 39 supra.
5v'he Ohio cases support arbitration to fix price. Brennan v. Brennan, 164
Ohio St. 29, 128 N.E.2d 89 (1955). Cf. Fitzgerald v. Continental Ins. Co., 275 App.
Div. 453, 9o N.Y.S.2d 430 (3d Dep't 1949). The author is indebted to Professor Carl
H. Fulda, College of Law, The Ohio State University, for help on the arbitra-
tion question.
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While vast estate tax savings may not be possible under a buy-sell
agreement providing for sale at actual or fair market value, one may
rest assured that arbitrators, one of whom represents the buyer, are
not likely to overvalue stock of a closely help corporation, frequently
an almost unmarketable asset. The cases giving conclusive effect for
estate tax purposes to a fixed price restriction should apply as well
to a price fixed at fair market value as determined by arbitration. Since
the arbitration will be binding on the parties it should be as deter-
minative for estate tax purposes as a fixed price stated in the contract
in terms of dollars.
VI. To FUND OR NOT To FUND?
That is the question. The practical advantage is obvious of provid-
ing funds to finance: (i) the redemption of shares, or (2) the purchase
of shares by surviving shareholders. Persons entering into such an
agreement do so with greater confidence and willingness if they are
assured that all other parties will be able to meet the financial ob-
ligations which eventually will arise. Life insurance has been used
for this purpose for many years. This form of funding possesses the
unique advantage that the full amount of the needed funds can be
assured no matter how early the need may arise. Unfortunately, fund-
ing, by life insurance or otherwise, presents numerous possibilities of
very adverse tax consequences, whether the plan contemplates a
redemption or a purchase by the surviving shareholders. Every drafts-
man must at least be familiar with the problems involved. While
space does not permit exhaustive consideration of these problems,
many of which are thoroughly discussed in other articles,5 1 an attempt
will be made to highlight the trouble spots and briefly indicate the
state of the present case law with regard to each.
A. Reciprocal Insurance: Double Estate Tax Inclusion?
Sometimes shareholders will enter into an agreement whereby
each takes out life insurance on his own life. This life insurance is then
transferred to a trustee who holds all policies. Premiums are paid re-
ciprocally, each shareholder paying his proportion of the premiums
on the insurance on the lives of the others. In the event of death
of any shareholder, the trustee is to apply the proceeds of insurance
on the deceased shareholder's life to pay the purchase price of thedecedent's shares, which are then acquired by the survivors.
-See note i supra, especially Lawthers.
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As recently as 1951, the Internal Revenue Service has maintained
that both the stock and the life insurance are subject to estate tax
in the estate of the deceased shareholder. Of course, the stock is taxable
as property owned by the decedent at the time of his death, even
though it is subject to option or contract to buy in favor of the sur-
viving shareholders. The theory for including the life insurance pro-
ceeds is that the decedent, indirectly through the reciprocal arrange-
ment, possessed the incidents of ownership of the policy on his life
and hence was taxable under section 2642. However, the proceeds of
the life insurance are, under the agreement, in effect allowed to the
survivors as a reduction of their purchase price of the stock. Therefore,
say the courts, it would be inequitable to tax both the life insurance
and the full value of the stock.52 The deceased shareholder's estate
has only the insurance or the stock at full value, not both.
B. Payment of Premiums by the Corporation: Income to Shareholders?
The Courts of Appeals of two circuits have recently completed
work on the deactivation of two Tax Court bombshells called Casale
5 3
and Prunier.54 A third case is presently receiving the attention of the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 55 Meanwhile, the Ninth Cir-
cuit, while giving judgment for the taxpayers, occasions speculation
over menacing negative implications.5 Troubled as the waters are, we
must venture forth upon them in the hope of salvaging "the fragile
bark" called Closely Held Corporation.
5'Estate of Ray E. Tompkins, 13 T.C. 1054 (1949), acq. 195o-1 Cum. Bull. 5;
Estate of John T. H. Mitchell, 37 B.T.A. 1 (1938), acq. 1938-1 Cum. Bull. 20; M. W.
Dobezensky, 34 B.T.A. 305 (1936) (NA); Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 3o B.T.A.
679 (1934); Estate of G. C. Ealy, 1o CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 431 (1951); Stuetzer, Some
Business Life Insurance Income Tax Problems, ii N.Y.U. Institute on Federal
Taxation 109, 124 (1953).
In order to avoid the reciprocal transfer problem, it might be advisable
(though perhaps impracticable) for each shareholder to take out a policy on the
life of each other shareholder, the proceeds payable to the owner of the policy.
This course has the blessing of the Treasury Department. Rev. Rul. 56-397, 1956-
2 Cum. Bull. 599.
5'Casale v. Comm'r, 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957). The Government will not
seek Supreme Court review. Note, 26 U. Cin. L. Rev. 642 (1957). Many of the ar-
ticles cited in note i supra are devoted to this case and to Prunier, infra note 54.
r4Prunier v. Comm'r, 248 F.2d 8W8 (st Cir. 1957). The Government will not
seek Supreme Court review.
r-Sanders v. Fox, 149 F. Supp. 942 (D.C. Utah, 1957), appeal to Tenth Circuit
filed by taxpayer June 14, 1957.
5Doran v. Comm'r, 246 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1957). The Government will not
seek Supreme Court review. As to the negative implications, see Lawthers, The
Fragile Bark of the Small Corporation, 12 J. Am. Soc'y C.L.U. 4, 17 (1957).
,Lawthers, cited in note 56 supra, credits the phrase to Judge Staley in Eme-
1oid, Co., Inc. v. Comm'r, 189 F.2d 23o (3rd Cir. ig5i).
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The present cases seem to justify the following tentative con-
clusions: i. Where the corporation pays the premiums on life insur-
ance purchased to fund a buy-sell agreement, premium payments will
not constitute realized dividend income to the shareholders if the life
insurance is an asset of the corporation alone in every respect. This
means that the corporation should have all incidents of ownership,
both nominally and equitably, and that the insurance policy must be
available to creditors of the corporation in the event of bankruptcy.
2. If life insurance is owned by a trustee for the shareholders, who
possesses the incidents of ownership, and if the policy is not available
to creditors of the corporation in the event of insolvency, then the
proceeds, when received by the trustee and applied in payment for
the decedent's shares, will be exempt from tax as life insurance pro-
ceeds under section ioi. It has been suggested that in this instance
there is a negative implication that the premiums paid by the cor-
poration are properly taxable as realized dividends to the shareholders
at the time the premiums are paid.
In conclusion it appears probable that a shareholder will not be
taxed on the premiums paid by the corporation if the policy is in
every sense a corporate, and not a shareholder, asset.
C. Accumulated Earnings Tax.
To this writer, the threat of the imposition of the accumulated
earnings tax on earnings set aside to fund the redemption of stock
presents the most serious menace of all to funded stock redemption
plans. The Seventh Circuit's recent unhesitating affirmance of the Tax
Court's strong medicine in the Pelton Steel case58 shows the gravity of
this danger.
Sections 531-37 impose a penalty tax, in addition to the ordinary
corporate tax, on a corporation which is "formed or availed of" to
prevent the imposition of income tax on its shareholders. The measure
of the annual tax is from 271/2 to 38V per cent of the "accumulated
taxable income" of the corporation. In order to arrive at the "accumu-
lated taxable income" on which the annual tax is imposed, two major
items are subtracted from "taxable income." The first is the federal
income tax. The second is an "accumulated earnings credit" which
is generally equal to "such part of the earnings and profits for the tax-
able year as are retained for the reasonable needs of the business... ,,9
r'pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Comm'r, 251 F.2d 278 (7 th Cir. 1958). The note
in 7 J. Taxation 96 (1957) discusses the case in the Tax Court.
0§ 535(c)(0).
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including the "reasonably anticipated needs of the business." 60 The
accumulation of earnings "beyond the reasonable needs of the business"
is "determinative of the purpose to avoid the income tax with respect
to shareholders, unless the corporation by the preponderance of the
evidence shall prove to the contrary."6 1 The 1954 Code shifts the
burden of proof on the question of reasonable needs of the business to
the Government if the taxpayer, in a deficiency case, submits a timely
statement "of the grounds (together with facts sufficient to show the
basis thereof) on which the taxpayer relies to establish that all or any
part of the earnings and profits have not been permitted to accumu-
late beyond the reasonable needs of the business."
62
In Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Commissioner,63 three persons owned
all the common stock. A owned 6o per cent and B and C each owned
2o per cent. A and B wished to dispose of their interest in Pelton Steel,
but C desired to avert an outside sale. C, who had made the business
of Pelton Steel his life's work, was very concerned that Pelton might
become a "captive foundry," engaged solely in filling the requirements
of a large steel company. C did not like the idea of Pelton Steel becom-
ing a subsidiary of some out-of-town corporation, with possible harm-
ful effects on employee relations and the status of key men in the
organization. It was finally agreed in 1946 that the corporation would
buy up and redeem 8o per cent of the common stock, all that was
held by A and B. The redemption price was placed at 8o per cent of
the selling price of the corporation's assets when offered to outsiders.
The following quotation from the opinion of the Court of Appeals
is clearly indicative of the principal basis for the decision:
"Financiers planning Pelton's purchase of the common stock
advised against a declaration and payment of dividends during
1946."
Both courts held that the accumulated earnings tax was properly
imposed for the year 1946. The Court of Appeals rejected, for reasons
that are not entirely clear, the taxpayer's assertion that maintaining
the existence of Pelton Steel as an independent corporation consti-
tuted a valid corporate business purpose. In part this conclusion ap-
pears to have been based on an affirmance of the Tax Court's "ulti-
mate finding of fact" which did not appear to the Court of Appeals




"See note 58 supra.
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rule,64 which tax lawyers and Congress thought was interred by a
1948 statutory amendment.65 The court distinguished two similar
cases that had been decided favorably to the taxpayers on the ground
that they had involved redemption of shares representing a minority
interest, whereas in Pelton the majority stock interest was redeemed.
The terseness of the court's discussion of this point leaves doubt as to
the relevance of this distinction. It may be germane, however, since
buying out a disagreeable minority shareholder frequently is justified
as serving to maintain harmony in the conduct of the corporation's
affairs, and in corporation-shareholder relations. However, it seems
hard to conceive of a dearer corporate business purpose than buying
out the majority interest in order to make possible the continued cor-
porate existence and independence of the corporation.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court reviews an extremely small
number of tax cases each year, and review of this decision is statistical-
ly improbable. The fact that no dividends were paid, a fact exception-
ally favorable to the Government, makes the case distinguishable from
many that will arise involving similar issues. The weakness in the
court's reasoning, coupled with the existence of authority favoring
the taxpayer, 6 makes a taxpayer victory in another circuit not im-
probable.
Meantime, however, the case on its reasoning appears to block
deliberate funding of corporate redemption plans. Depending upon
the circumstances, the accumulated earnings tax will either put the
shareholders in the same overall position as though they had pur-
4Dobson v. Comm'r, 32o U.S. 489 (1943) held that if the question decided by
the Tax Court involved less than a clear-cut question "of law," appellate courts
should not substitute their judgment for that of the highly expert Tax Court.
rIn 1948, § 1141(a), Int. Rev. Code of 1939, was amended so as to provide
that the courts of appeals should have the same power to review Tax Court de-
cisions as they have to review decisions of district courts sitting without a jury.
62 Stat. 991. The provision is now to be found in Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7482(a).
Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that such findings
of fact are to be set aside only if "clearly erroneous." The intention was clearly
to change the effect of the Dobson decision, note 64 supra.
ODiIl Manufacturing Co., 39 B.T.A. 1023 (1939); Gazette Publishing Co. v.
Self, 103 F. Supp. 779 (D. Ark. 1952). The authority of the Gazette case is weakened
by the fact that apparently the idea of buying out a shareholder arose after the
taxable year as to which the earnings tax was sought to be imposed. In Emeloid
Co. v. Comm'r, 189 F.2d 23o (3rd Cir. 1951), the agreement to use life insurance
proceeds to redeem stock was executed after the taxable year in question, and the
court expressed doubt as to its relevance. The case did not involve the accumulated
earnings tax, but the borrowed capital credit for purposes of excess profits tax. It
was held that the "key man" life insurance served a valid corporate business purpose.
Some of the court's language is certainly in conflict with the viewpoint of the
Seventh Circuit in Pelton Steel, note 58 supra.
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chased the shares out of their own double-taxed income, or perhaps
in an even worse position. The great advantage of redemption plans
over shareholder stock purchase plans may be completely lost or even
overbalanced by the additional cost of the accumulated earnings
tax. Until this case is either reversed or counterbalanced by similarly
weighty authority favoring the taxpayer, it is this writer's view that
a funded redemption plan, at least for a majority interest, involves
an unreasonable risk. Perhaps one solution to the funding problem
would lie in having the corporation borrow money to finance the
redemption when the necessity arises.
67
Taxpayers' counsel can hope that the depressing effect of the Pelton
case will be weakened in the not too distant future, perhaps opening
the way for the resumption of funding of this reasonable business
need before the immediate financial requirements are encountered.
D. Conclusion: To Fund or Not to Fund?
While double estate tax inclusion is not a serious threat, insurance
funding of shareholder-purchase plans can be accomplished only at
the cost of the double tax. That is, either the premiums must be paid
by the shareholders out of double-taxed income, or, if the corporation
pays the premiums for a trust fund available to the shareholders,
dividend income will probably arise with each premium payment
0 8
On the other hand, funding within the corporation involves a serious
threat of the accumulated earnings tax if the debatable reasoning of
the Pelton case is rigorously followed. Some taxpayers' counsel may
dismiss Pelton because no dividends were declared during the period
in question, and because the reasoning does not strongly commend it
as an authority in the decision of other cases. However, until its force
is weakened, many will feel that deliberate funding of a stock re-
demption plan cannot be recommended. While the decision stands, a
redemption plan may have to be carried into effect by borrowing,
which might include the issuance of secured long term negotiable
notes to shareholders in exchange for the redeemed stock.69
6Query whether the use of earnings subsequent to redemption to discharge debt
incurred to finance the redemption, is immune to attack under § 531. Where cor-
poration notes are issued to former shareholders in exchange for their stock, the
debt would be an integral part of the redemption transaction. Is this latter trans-
action safer under § 531 than borrowing from outsiders? The departing shareholder
may not be satisfied to accept corporate notes, although in many cases there may
be no real alternative.
68See note 56 supra.
OSee note 67 supra.
BUY-SELL TAX PROBLEMS
VII. CONCLUSION
A corporation-life-insurance-funded redemption plan accompanied
by first offer restrictions during life and an option at death is perhaps
the most desirable arrangement. Until the Sanders case70 is decided
on appeal, and Pelton Steel7l is somehow weakened or counteracted,
such funding involves tax hazards so serious that, at least for the time
being, funding is hazardous.
A feasible alternative that can be immediately employed is an
agreement that provides: (1) during the life of the shareholder his
first offer must be made to the corporation, and if the corporation de-
clines, an offer of a proportionate number of shares must be made
to remaining shareholders; (2) a binding option entitles the corpora-
tion to purchase from the estate of a deceased shareholder, and
the surviving shareholders to purchase a proportionate number of
shares if the corporation declines. Appropriate safety valve provisions
should be inserted to protect selling shareholders and estates from
fragment purchases and from being required to redeem a smaller
or larger number of shares than would qualify for assured capital gain
treatment under sections 302 and 303. The possible shareholder pur-
chase could be partially funded by shareholder-owned life insurance
paid for by shareholders with no tax risk to the corporation and with
shareholders getting the full benefit of the insurance for which they
might be taxed (under Sanders) even if corporation-owned.
7OSee note 55 supra.
71See note 58 supra.
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